# Final Exam Review

## PHILO 365: Medical Ethics

Nathan Kellen

Kansas State University

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Reagan Moege:

> *Can you explain Thompson's argument for why fetuses do not have a right to life?*

Keri Pfrang:

*Can you review The Impermissibility of Abortion in a "broad sense"? It seems like a lifetime ago when we learned about this and going through my notes, it's not making much sense to me.*

Madelyn Hilgers:

> *If Marquis believes that deprivation of an FLO is what makes killing wrong, he would agree that abortion in most cases is not only depriving a fetus of an FLO, but killing a fetus right? Marquis says to avoid the discussion of deciding whether or not fetus is a human/person. This is a little confusing to me because wouldn't you have to determine this to determine whether you are committing the act of killing?*

Isaac Fitz:

> *How would utilitarianism play into abortion and the potential harm of bringing a child into this world in terms of utility?*

Travis Hodge:

*Could you explain FLO again.*

Piper Brandt:

> *What were the holes in Marquis' argument? I remember discussing this briefly a while ago, there were conditions of the abortion argument he glossed over.*

Kacie Rohlman:

*What problems would Purdy have with Marquis' Future Like Ours principle? And vice versa, what problems would Marquis have with Purdy's Minimally Satisfying Life standard?*

Ashton Jueneman:

> *Is there any way that you can further explain the disability-positive view and how Barnes' claims these objections are false. I went back through the slides and am still slightly confused.*

Brock Brethour:

> *Does the mere difference view apply to all forms of disability, even some of the most severe forms where one can not move, communicate, or take care of themselves? Or do they refer to this for only the mild and moderate forms of disability?*

Brock Brethour:

> *Barnes states some contradictions where it is not always immoral to cause disability and sometimes it is sometimes not morally permissible to remove it. Where would Barnes make this distinction and draw the line?*

Natalie Mullin:

> *What would the utilitarian think about anti-natalism? Would they agree with it because it would be preventing future pain? Or would they disagree because it would take away future pleasure too?*

Cara Hopkins:

> *What would the Kantian and utilitarian say about procreation? Kantians argue that all lives are intrinsically valuable, but if procreation was considered morally wrong, those potential lives wouldn't be lives at all. Would procreation maximize utility or would having children decrease the amount of utility the parents would be able to provide society?*

Brock Brethour:

*Would you say there are any situations Benatar would retract his statement for, or say is the rare case where it is the opposite?*

Isaac Fitz:

> *How would utilitarianism play into abortion and the potential harm of bringing a child into this world in terms of utility?*

Brock Brethour:

> *Can you summarize Weinberg's experiment with making Peeps and when it is morally permissible? I had a little trouble following it and think it would be a good review to go over again.*

Emma Stimatze:

*What is the difference between ICAA and ICEC? Does ICEC still include the patient understanding the action or just the policies involved?*

Hailey Hunter:

*What is the difference between ICAA and ICEC?*

Madison Jensen:

> *When talking about informed consent, autonomous authorization is the priority, but what about in cases involving a minor or a person that is unable to make medical decisions on their own? Would parental or guardian consent be enough to gain consent for the patient? This would satisfy ICEC, but would it satisfy ICAA?*

Anna Stamps:

> *What is the difference between pure and impure paternalism? I never really understood this, will we be tested over this?*

Kale Mills:

> *What are the important aspects of Dworkin's argument that says paternalism is justified in some cases? In what cases does he specifically state it is justified? Looking back at the material this is one of the papers that I had trouble with.*

Brock Brethour:

> *Daniels makes a distinction between necessary treatments and optional treatments, but in Daniels view who would realistically make these distinctions and what are the differences. I feel like there are treatments that some would argue are optional and some would argue as necessary and he leaves it kind of open ended.*

Brock Brethour:

> *Flanigan mentions vaccines against tetanus and other serious but not contagious diseases should not be compulsory to be vaccinated against. Flanigan does not mention the fact that these vaccines are for children where parents are making the decision for their children, where their children will be having to face the consequences of their parents actions. Do you think due to this fact the Flanigan would still hold his belief or would maybe slightly alter what he states?*

Brock Brethour:

> *What is the difference between Utilitarianism versus the standard rational decision theory? They seem very similar to me and I am not sure what the distinct differences are.*