Research Interests
My research is primarily in metaphysics and the philosophy of logic. My dissertation, Pluralisms about Truth and Logic, looks at the theoretical connections between truth pluralism and logical pluralism. I'm heavily influenced throughout by Dummettian anti-realism. I see truth pluralism as the spiritual successor to Michael Dummett's general anti-realist programme, and am interested in how plausible a theory of truth which combines Dummett's insights and more standard philosophical consensus can be. In the philosophy of logic I am primarily interested in questions about the nature of logical consequence, what the standards of correctness for logic(s) are and how many correct logics there are. I self-identify as a non-classical logician (unsurprisingly, an intuitionist) and am interested in capturing the philosophical disagreements between rival logicians in a philosophically sophisticated and exegetically accurate way.
One cannot work on truth and logic without considering their role in other areas, and thus I have a number of other research projects related to my work on truth and logic. I'm interested in the roles of truth and logic in our social practices and have begun dipping my toes into social epistemology to tackle some of these questions. I've also begun work on whether pluralist theories of truth and logic imply pluralist theories of other phenomena, like ethics and mathematics.
I'm engaged in a large-scale research project in the history of analytic philosophy on the work and influence of Sir Michael Dummett. I am co-editor, with Andrew Parisi, of the Michael Dummett Project, a (soon-to-be) online resource devoted to Dummett's work. The project will contain the first full bibliography of Dummett's work across philosophy, theology, voting theory and Tarot history. It will also feature a searchable database of Dummett's philosophical works and a bibliography of philosophical work about and responding to Dummett. We are also collaborating on some papers on Dummett's philosophical work.
Further afield from these projects I am interested in animal ethics and how empirical research into the nature of animal cognition, sociality and behaviour can inform our theories animal ethics. The implications can be followed in at least two directions. First, towards our normative ethical theories of what we owe to non-human animals. Second, towards our metaethical theories, specifically those which claim that morality is a solely-human endeavour.
One cannot work on truth and logic without considering their role in other areas, and thus I have a number of other research projects related to my work on truth and logic. I'm interested in the roles of truth and logic in our social practices and have begun dipping my toes into social epistemology to tackle some of these questions. I've also begun work on whether pluralist theories of truth and logic imply pluralist theories of other phenomena, like ethics and mathematics.
I'm engaged in a large-scale research project in the history of analytic philosophy on the work and influence of Sir Michael Dummett. I am co-editor, with Andrew Parisi, of the Michael Dummett Project, a (soon-to-be) online resource devoted to Dummett's work. The project will contain the first full bibliography of Dummett's work across philosophy, theology, voting theory and Tarot history. It will also feature a searchable database of Dummett's philosophical works and a bibliography of philosophical work about and responding to Dummett. We are also collaborating on some papers on Dummett's philosophical work.
Further afield from these projects I am interested in animal ethics and how empirical research into the nature of animal cognition, sociality and behaviour can inform our theories animal ethics. The implications can be followed in at least two directions. First, towards our normative ethical theories of what we owe to non-human animals. Second, towards our metaethical theories, specifically those which claim that morality is a solely-human endeavour.
Publications
"The Normative Problem for Logical Pluralism"
in Inquiry (Vol. 63, 2020, Issue 3-4)
It is commonly thought that logic, whatever it may be, is normative. While accounting for the normativity of logic is a challenge for any view of logic, in this paper I argue that it is particularly problematic for certain types of logical pluralists due to what I call the normative problem for logical pluralism (NPLP). I introduce the NPLP, distinguish it from other problems that logical pluralists may face, and show that it is unsolvable for one prominent type of logical pluralism.
"Methodological Pluralism about Truth"
in Pluralisms in Truth and Logic, eds. Pedersen, Wyatt, Kellen, Palgrave MacMillan, 2018
This paper analyses various truth pluralist views in the literature by their methodological commitments. I argue that truth pluralism is best interpreted as a combination of (semantic) realism and anti-realism, and as the spiritual successor to Michael Dummett's global anti-realist programme. My analysis cuts across the standard way of dividing up various types of pluralist views -- the strong-moderate pluralist distinction -- and reveals a difference in views that the strong-moderate distinction is incapable of recognising. I close by offering arguments in favour of what I call methodological pluralism about truth, which privileges neither its realist or anti-realist forebears.
in Inquiry (Vol. 63, 2020, Issue 3-4)
It is commonly thought that logic, whatever it may be, is normative. While accounting for the normativity of logic is a challenge for any view of logic, in this paper I argue that it is particularly problematic for certain types of logical pluralists due to what I call the normative problem for logical pluralism (NPLP). I introduce the NPLP, distinguish it from other problems that logical pluralists may face, and show that it is unsolvable for one prominent type of logical pluralism.
"Methodological Pluralism about Truth"
in Pluralisms in Truth and Logic, eds. Pedersen, Wyatt, Kellen, Palgrave MacMillan, 2018
This paper analyses various truth pluralist views in the literature by their methodological commitments. I argue that truth pluralism is best interpreted as a combination of (semantic) realism and anti-realism, and as the spiritual successor to Michael Dummett's global anti-realist programme. My analysis cuts across the standard way of dividing up various types of pluralist views -- the strong-moderate pluralist distinction -- and reveals a difference in views that the strong-moderate distinction is incapable of recognising. I close by offering arguments in favour of what I call methodological pluralism about truth, which privileges neither its realist or anti-realist forebears.
Edited Volumes
The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives (2nd ed.)
eds. Lynch, Wyatt, Kim and Kellen, MIT Press, 2021
The definitive and essential collection of classic and new essays on analytic theories of truth, revised and updated, with seventeen new chapters.
The question “What is truth?” is so philosophical that it can seem rhetorical. Yet truth matters, especially in a “post-truth” society in which lies are tolerated and facts are ignored. If we want to understand why truth matters, we first need to understand what it is. The Nature of Truth offers the definitive collection of classic and contemporary essays on analytic theories of truth. This second edition has been extensively revised and updated, incorporating both historically central readings on truth's nature as well as up-to-the-moment contemporary essays. Seventeen new chapters reflect the current trajectory of research on truth.
Highlights include new essays by Ruth Millikan and Gila Sher on correspondence theories; a new essay on Peirce's theory by Cheryl Misak; seven new essays on deflationism, laying out both theories and critiques; a new essay by Jamin Asay on primitivist theories; and a new defense by Kevin Scharp of his replacement theory, coupled with a probing critique of replacement theories by Alexis Burgess. Classic essays include selections by J. L. Austin, Donald Davidson, William James, W. V. O. Quine, and Alfred Tarski.
Pluralisms in Truth and Logic
eds. Wyatt, Pedersen, Kellen, Palgrave MacMillan, 2018
This edited volume brings together 18 state-of-the art essays on pluralism about truth and logic. Parts I and II are dedicated to respectively truth pluralism and logical pluralism, and Part III to their interconnections. Some contributors challenge pluralism, arguing that the nature of truth or logic is uniform. The majority of contributors, however, defend pluralism, articulate novel versions of the view, or contribute to fundamental debates internal to the pluralist camp. The volume will be of interest to truth theorists and philosophers of logic, as well as philosophers interested in relativism, contextualism, metaphysics, philosophy of language, semantics, paradox, epistemology, or normativity.
eds. Lynch, Wyatt, Kim and Kellen, MIT Press, 2021
The definitive and essential collection of classic and new essays on analytic theories of truth, revised and updated, with seventeen new chapters.
The question “What is truth?” is so philosophical that it can seem rhetorical. Yet truth matters, especially in a “post-truth” society in which lies are tolerated and facts are ignored. If we want to understand why truth matters, we first need to understand what it is. The Nature of Truth offers the definitive collection of classic and contemporary essays on analytic theories of truth. This second edition has been extensively revised and updated, incorporating both historically central readings on truth's nature as well as up-to-the-moment contemporary essays. Seventeen new chapters reflect the current trajectory of research on truth.
Highlights include new essays by Ruth Millikan and Gila Sher on correspondence theories; a new essay on Peirce's theory by Cheryl Misak; seven new essays on deflationism, laying out both theories and critiques; a new essay by Jamin Asay on primitivist theories; and a new defense by Kevin Scharp of his replacement theory, coupled with a probing critique of replacement theories by Alexis Burgess. Classic essays include selections by J. L. Austin, Donald Davidson, William James, W. V. O. Quine, and Alfred Tarski.
Pluralisms in Truth and Logic
eds. Wyatt, Pedersen, Kellen, Palgrave MacMillan, 2018
This edited volume brings together 18 state-of-the art essays on pluralism about truth and logic. Parts I and II are dedicated to respectively truth pluralism and logical pluralism, and Part III to their interconnections. Some contributors challenge pluralism, arguing that the nature of truth or logic is uniform. The majority of contributors, however, defend pluralism, articulate novel versions of the view, or contribute to fundamental debates internal to the pluralist camp. The volume will be of interest to truth theorists and philosophers of logic, as well as philosophers interested in relativism, contextualism, metaphysics, philosophy of language, semantics, paradox, epistemology, or normativity.
Work In Progress
[A paper on logical functionalism]
In this paper I argue for a new methodology in the philosophy of logic to investigate the concept of logical consequence. I propose that logical consequence be treated as a functional concept -- a concept defined by its functional role -- and give a sketch of how of this type of conceptual analysis would go. The theory, which I call logical functionalism, is then applied to the logical pluralism debate, and is shown to have multiple advantages, including being able to arbitrate between competing pluralist and monist positions.
[A paper on the logic of truth pluralism]
Truth pluralism is the theory according to which there is more than one property of sentences in virtue of which sentences are true. For example, truth pluralists may hold that some sentences are true in virtue of correspondence with facts in the world, while others are true in virtue of some other epistemic property. Given the close connection between truth and logical consequence, some truth pluralists claim they are committed to logical pluralism, the view that there are multiple equally correct logics, as well. This is due to the fact that traditionally correspondence theories of truth have been thought to require classical logic, while epistemic theories require some non-classical logic. In this paper, I propose that the truth pluralist should not give in to logical pluralism, and instead should recognise that she is committed to intuitionistic logic by her principles of truth alone. I then show how to engage in a "classical recapture" programme which gives the truth pluralist classical logical behaviour in correspondence domains, and intuitionistic behaviour in epistemic domains. The strategy is to augment intuitionistic logic with non-logical (or metaphysical) premises, which regains the classical behaviour the truth pluralist needs, while retaining logical monism. The paper ends with a discussion of how to differentiate logical principles from non-logical principles along these lines.
[A paper on Dummett and pluralism about truth]
Michael Dummett is best known for championing the research programme that he called "anti-realism". While Dummett has often been interpreted as holding anti-realism as a global thesis, late in his career Dummett denied this interpretation. In this paper I examine Dummett's later corpus and argue that not only was his final position not a form of global anti-realism, but in fact it is a form of truth pluralism.
In this paper I argue for a new methodology in the philosophy of logic to investigate the concept of logical consequence. I propose that logical consequence be treated as a functional concept -- a concept defined by its functional role -- and give a sketch of how of this type of conceptual analysis would go. The theory, which I call logical functionalism, is then applied to the logical pluralism debate, and is shown to have multiple advantages, including being able to arbitrate between competing pluralist and monist positions.
[A paper on the logic of truth pluralism]
Truth pluralism is the theory according to which there is more than one property of sentences in virtue of which sentences are true. For example, truth pluralists may hold that some sentences are true in virtue of correspondence with facts in the world, while others are true in virtue of some other epistemic property. Given the close connection between truth and logical consequence, some truth pluralists claim they are committed to logical pluralism, the view that there are multiple equally correct logics, as well. This is due to the fact that traditionally correspondence theories of truth have been thought to require classical logic, while epistemic theories require some non-classical logic. In this paper, I propose that the truth pluralist should not give in to logical pluralism, and instead should recognise that she is committed to intuitionistic logic by her principles of truth alone. I then show how to engage in a "classical recapture" programme which gives the truth pluralist classical logical behaviour in correspondence domains, and intuitionistic behaviour in epistemic domains. The strategy is to augment intuitionistic logic with non-logical (or metaphysical) premises, which regains the classical behaviour the truth pluralist needs, while retaining logical monism. The paper ends with a discussion of how to differentiate logical principles from non-logical principles along these lines.
[A paper on Dummett and pluralism about truth]
Michael Dummett is best known for championing the research programme that he called "anti-realism". While Dummett has often been interpreted as holding anti-realism as a global thesis, late in his career Dummett denied this interpretation. In this paper I examine Dummett's later corpus and argue that not only was his final position not a form of global anti-realism, but in fact it is a form of truth pluralism.